

What will be most remembered about **the 21st century** is the great and final shift of rural, agricultural life and into cities. It **will put an end to the major theme of human history, continuous population growth.**

I have found in Mumbai, Tehran, Sao Paulo, Mexico City, Paris, Amsterdam, and Los Angeles places were people who had been born in villages, who had their minds and ambitions fixed on the symbolic center of the city, and who were engaged in a struggle of monumental scope to find a basic and lasting berth in the city for their children. This ex-rural population was creating similar urban spaces all over the world whose physical appearance varied but whose basic set of functions, whose network of human relationships, was distinct and identifiable. It is here that serious and sustained investments from governments and agencies are most likely to create lasting and incorruptible benefit.

One man who lives in Chongqing, China, moved from the village of Liu Gong Li. There is no talk of returning: This filth and all, is the better life. "Here, you can turn your grandchildren into successful people if you find the right way to make a living—in the village you can only live." All down the valley, the gray cubism materializes into a quilt of tiny, officially non-existent industries hidden behind ramshackle concrete slum buildings. In every unpainted concrete cube, it is the same rhythm of arrival, struggle, support, saving, planning, calculation. Almost all sent money, quite often almost all of their earnings, back to support the village and to put some into savings for their children's education here in the city. The main function of this place is *arrival*. It is a place of transition that will either someday become part of the core city itself or will fail and decay into poverty or be destroyed. It is linked in a lasting and intensive way to its *originating villages* and to the *established city*. Here is the new center of the world.

None of the hundreds of dwellings fully belong to their owners, even though many have purchased title deeds from the collective and buy and sell their houses for profit. The thriving property market has driven rents and unofficial land prices upward, giving the village-migrant "owners" a source of capital through rent, sublease, and property speculation—none of it official or taxed—which they often use to launch businesses. At any moment, the city authorities could bulldoze the whole district and either throw all 120,000 residents out or move them into apartment blocks with clean, official garment factories next door. Dina has done this to hundreds of such neighborhoods. Officials want to urbanize as fast as possible, at a rate of growth that can't possibly be absorbed without an exponential increase in the high-density, informal settlements.

The arrival city is not a temporary anomaly. In inland Chinese cities, these arrival-city "villages" have become intrinsic, if unacknowledged, parts of the city's growth plan, its economy and its way of life. "We all want to quit being peasants, and China wants us to become city-dwellers, but they've made it so difficult to get there."

Many residents there have staked their entire lives on their children's education. China's "floating population" of 150-200m people (often both parents) bounce between an arrival city and their originating villages where their children live with grandparents until they can afford to bring them. 1/6th of the Chinese population are neither villagers nor official urbanites. This need for poor village migrants to sacrifice much of their earnings to health, education, and emergency savings has kept many residents trapped in an uncomfortable world that is neither urban nor rural, isolating them from their own children. "For now, we will have to eat the bitterness."

It is rare, anywhere in the world, to find a family who grew up on a dirt floor and made it in the same generation, into the middle-class world of mortgages and shopping malls. Arrival cities each year absorb 2m people, mainly villagers, from the developing world. Yet, to see their grim conditions as normal is to ignore the arrival cities' great success: it is, in the most successful parts of both the developing and the Western world, the key instrument in creating a new middle class, abolishing the horrors of rural poverty and ending inequality.

The first arrival-city function is the creation and maintenance of a *network*: a web of human relationships connecting village to arrival city to established city. Then it functions as an entry mechanism. It not only takes people in by providing cheap housing and assistance in finding entry-level jobs (through the networks), but also makes possible the next wave of arrivals in a process known as chain migration. Next, the arrival city functions as an urban establishment platform: it provides informal resources that allow the village migrant, after saving and becoming part of the network, to purchase a house (through credit and informal or legal deeds), to start a small business (through loans, buildings, relationships), to reach out to the larger city for higher education, or to assume a position of political leadership. Finally, it provides a social-mobility path into either the middle class or the sustainable, permanently employed and propertied ranks of the upper-working class.

The modern arrival city is the product of the final great human migration. A third of the world's population is on the move this century, from village to city, a move that began in earnest shortly after WW2. The wealthy nations of North America, Europe, Australasia, and Japan are now 72-95% urban. But only 41% of Asians and 38% of Africans live in cities--on the land because they are trapped. **By the century's end the entire world will be more than 75% urban.** Once humans urbanize, or migrate to more urban countries, they almost never return. There is no romance in village life. **Rural living is the largest single killer of humans today**, the greatest source of malnutrition, infant mortality, and reduced lifespans. The dramatic declines in the number of poor people in the world were caused entirely by urbanization, which doesn't just improve the lives of those who move to the city. It improves conditions in the countryside, too, by giving villages the finances

they need to turn agriculture into a business with salaried jobs and stable incomes.

Slums are villages in the city. Los Angeles barrios are each directly linked to a Mexican or Central American village. Many arrival cities began as slums, but not all slums are arrival cities. Some turned into places of failed arrival—a threat that hangs over many arrival cities today. Many of the most desirable neighborhoods in New York, London, Paris, and Toronto began as arrival cities.

Arrival cities are ending population growth. When villagers migrate to the city, their family size drops on average by at least one child/family, often to below the steady-population rate of 2.1 children. Without massive rural-to-urban migration, the world's population would be growing at a far faster pace. After peaking at 9m, for the first time in history, humans will stop being more numerous each year—a direct product of urbanization.

The arrival city accomplished the things that bring fertility rates down: educating girls and women, improving health, and creating physical and financial security. The arrival city is a machine that transforms humans. It is also, if allowed to flourish, the instrument that will create a permanently sustainable world. Small businesses are at the heart of almost any successful arrival city, and their absence, or the presence of laws that keep immigrants from opening them, is often the factor that turns arrival cities into poverty traps.

Rural villages receive remittances from migrants and their descendants living abroad. This transforms the constant tide of villagers into financially secure and culturally successful urbanites and it transforms the village, through infusions of cash, into a more urban and cultured place, which can support itself.

New arrival cities of Europe and North America have plumbing, sewage and Internet access, but are sometimes as alien and threatening to their native populations as the slums of Asia are to their cities' established residents. A good part of their success or failure has to do with its physical form—the layout of streets and buildings, the transportation links to the economic and cultural core of the city, the direct access to the street from building, the proximity to schools, health centers and social services, the existence of a sufficiently high density housing, the presence of parks and neutral public spaces, the ability to open a shop on the ground floor and add rooms to your dwelling.

The London-born Bangladeshis, the children of the curry-house owners and sweatshop workers, have marched into the center of British society. They perform better in school than less concentrated immigrant groups and considerably better than the local white English population. There are now as many Bangladeshi Britons departing Tower Hamlets for middle-class districts of London each year as there are arriving from Sylheti villages. This neighborhood, in other words, is a functioning integration machine. Tightened immigration laws made the arranged marriage a necessary tool for

reuniting villages, even though it revived a conservative practice that was nearly obsolete among Bangladeshis. British society, especially in the big cities, increasingly sees the arrival city as a source of fellow citizens, not as an alien threat. If people are flowing through it, transformed into full-fledged contributors to the life of the city whether they leave the arrival city or stay there, then it is working.

The world's population shifts cityward in a back-and-forth oscillation of single individuals and clusters of villagers, pushed and pulled by tides of agriculture and economy, climate and politics. It is a reciprocal movement, which urbanizes the village as much as it revitalizes the city. It serves as a sorting and selection mechanism, leaving the most ambitious and able in the city. Everywhere in the developing world, this was how the great urban migration began. In the decades after WW2, manufacturing economies bloomed and became labor-intensive, and a great wave of road building made it possible for isolated farmers to consider the possibility of working in the city between harvest periods.

Newcomers to big cities, throughout history and around the world, are almost all rural people. The informal economy, previously considered a parasitic irrelevance on the edge of the "main" industrial economy, now represents 1/4 of all jobs in post-communist countries, 1/3 in N Africa, 1/2 in Latin America, 70% in India, and more than 90% in the poorest African countries. It is a form of work that is available to almost everyone who comes to the city. Self-employment, the starting-point of the arrival city, has become the global norm. The mobile phone has become, like kerosene, almost a necessity of life for the very poor of the world. The rural poor of the developing world thrive by building "joint portfolios" of farming, business, and migration remittance, to hedge economic risk across several platforms.

Like many middle-class Indian couples, the employers of an Indian girl keeps her in a vestige of the cast system on a promise to ensure her urban welfare, plus some funds sent to her family to support them between harvests, but, more importantly, on a guarantee that they will pay her dowry and other costs when she marries a village boy, likely at 18. Dowry fees are a constant and agonizing source of worry for peasant farmers, most acutely in India but to a lesser extent throughout the developing world. Although the participants may embrace this arrangement, this form of employment falls within most accepted definitions of slavery.

Often this back-and-forth migration recurs for many generations. But a tipping point may be reached when the entire family, and sometimes the entire village, shifts its allegiances and investments to the city and ceases to rely on agriculture in a "migration transition." People who had been to school, and had information coming from the city, tend to stop moving back and forth and make the transition sooner and more thoroughly. *Chain migration* moves sets of related individuals or households from one place to another via a set of social arrangements in which those at the destination provide aid, information and encouragement to new migrants, and is

the central mechanism today. Through this cycle of selection are produced the most inventive and resilient population groups in the world. Those who make it into the slums and shantytowns are the winners of the rural-urban lottery, the best of the best from the villages. Slum dwellers are generally more robust than the rest of the urban population.

The local cable-TV man is a powerful and influential figure in a new slum, in good part because his is the first and most reliable utility to be delivered, years or decades ahead of running water, postal services, and sewage. Residents believe that the filth and disorder are temporary and in the dynamics of a community that envisions itself becoming crisp, paved, lighted, legal, sanitary and fully linked to the city as soon as possible. These are, in the words of a United Nations agency, not “slums of despair” but rather “slums of hope.” Poor people move house frequently and arrival cities, in their early years, are places of constant movement and change. Life is a bet on the future of the children. Arrival cities are places of generational deferral, in which entire lives are sacrificed, often in appalling conditions, for a child’s better opportunity.

By the 1980s many enclaves, even those that had been repeatedly bulldozed, had evolved into full-fledged cities, with hundreds of thousands of inhabitants, legitimate governments of their own, and influential middle classes and internal economies. Land nowadays tends to be private with clear owners, as opposed to the socialized ownership or ambiguous land titles that blanketed the developing world in the early days. Because arrival cities are so widely misunderstood and distrusted—dismissed as static “slums: rather than places of dynamic change—governments have devoted much of the past 60 years to attempting to prevent their formation. **Countries rarely experience economic growth while banning or restricting rural-urban migration:** without urbanization, the economy stagnates, and people often starve.

Brazil’s 1980s study revealed that **the unimpeded arrival city was a more effective form of development than any known economic, social, or population-control policy.** By the end of the 20th century, many economists and some governments realized that rural-urban migration, far from being a problem for poor countries, was the key to their economic futures. The most effective route to poverty reduction and economic growth is to encourage the highest possible urban population density and the growth of the largest cities through migration—as long as the urban areas where rural migrants arrive are given intensive investment and infrastructure development by governments.

In Shenzhen, China, “we’d prefer to live in separate dorms, the smaller ones with 4-6 other workers in the room, because it’s so much cheaper and more convenient to do so. If we tried to get an apartment, we would never save any money.” In a city of 14m, only 2.1m are entitled to have their children educated in the city. New people create new economies, and those economies develop best when they, no matter how poor, are able to stage their arrival in an organic, self-generated, bottom-up fashion.

The failure to secure tenure, more than anything, has contributed to the failure of places like Kibera, Nairobi, Kenya: If you can’t own your house, it is very hard to rise above your circumstances. The real-estate market is one of the most effective levers for escaping poverty. Slum-redevelopment projects have a way of turning into middle-class enclaves on the edge of the slum. The arrival city is far more than a pile of housing. Its residents are connected in complex networks and use the space as a source of upward mobility by operating businesses and informal enterprises there. **Housing without business space can lock tenants into permanent dependency.** Neighbors are important. When you have a good understanding and relationship with them, they can keep you alive.

Santa Marta, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil residents were given a birth certificate and a street address. If an impediment can be removed, if the state can provide the basic fruits of the city to its residents, then an arrival city will take care of itself, like a river freed from an ice dam. South America was the first place in the world to experience the great postwar rural-to-urban migration, 4 decades ahead of most of Asia and Africa. It is now the first fully urbanized place in the developing world.

Brazil went from 45% urban in the 1960s to 75% in the 1980s—almost as urban as Europe. President Lula grew up in a Sao Paulo slum and is among the first generation of politicians, including Turkish prime minister Recep Erdogan, to be products of the arrival city and to build their political constituency from its ex-migrant residents. If left to its own devices and deprived of access to the larger political system, the arrival city will generate a defensive politics of its own. In Brazil, it took the form of the drug gang. In Mumbai, it is Hindu nationalism. In the arrival cities of Europe, Islamic extremism. Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa was the first arrival-city child to run one of America’s major cities, Los Angeles.

Peasant districts in Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Mexico, have turned southern and south-central Los Angeles into a quilt of arrival cities. Such notoriously dysfunctional neighborhoods as South Central, Crenshaw, Watts, and Compton turned into Spanish-speaking enclaves, where arrivals struggled to dig in, buy their homes, and set up shop. Central Americans are not just getting by and searching for work but building full and coherent arrival cities.

The final great wave of rural-urban migration, as it moves the final half of humanity from village to city, is transforming the cities of the wealthy West as much as its is changing the urban fabric of Asia, South America, and Africa. Most Westerners do not understand that what is taking place in their cities is a process of rural-to-urban migration. The incomes and absolute poverty levels are different, but the frustrations, opportunities, remedies, and dangers are the same.

There is a booming transnational property trade, driven by a population who aspire to entrepreneurship, education, and home ownership. Los Angeles stands out as the premier arrival-city cluster of the US. Toronto plays a similar role in Canada—“gateway cities” which is to say broadly successful arrival cities. People move through its neighborhood:

Los Angeles flushes out at least 1/3 of its population each decade, becoming an entirely new city each generation. Nevertheless, the neighborhoods themselves often stay poor or even get poorer. This downward trend for the place is the opposite indicator of the upward trend enjoyed by the residents themselves.

This leads to a misunderstanding of the forms of government investment needed—a serious policy problem in many migrant-based cities around the world. Rather than getting the tools of ownership, education, security, business creation, and connection to the wider economy, they are often treated as destitute places that need non-solutions, such as social workers, public-housing blocks, and urban-planned redevelopments. In the past, the US has granted amnesties to large numbers of illegal migrants, transforming them from informal, non-taxpaying underground workers into legitimate citizens who can invest in their society.

The villager will be a feature of the Western city throughout this century because the countries of the West will experience severe labor shortages throughout the century in both skilled and unskilled fields. This is caused by shrinking family sizes leading to a fast-aging population. Immigration will be the least painful and most voter-friendly solution. It will also continue for political reasons. Immigrants and their families become citizens and voters and politicians and cabinet ministers and ideologies by the overweening issue of access to each other. The only countries that have managed to control levels of immigration have been those with authoritarian governments—communist, fascist, autocratic. **Almost all policy efforts to restrict or end immigration have failed** because the purported subjects of the laws were already active citizens, using the arrival city as a platform for its own self-preservation. Amnesties are almost certain in the future.

Labor shortages often tend to be in low-skilled and semi-skilled areas unsuited to elite, highly educated immigrants. At the height of the crash in 2009, the sectors reporting serious labor shortages in Europe and North America included household services, agriculture, transportation, construction, tourism, catering services, and frontline social services. To bring in only urban, university-educated elites to fill these vacancies is a waste both of human potential and of foreign policy, since they often get their degrees at universities in their own countries that have been funded by foreign governments to help create medical, legal, and technical knowledge in the developing world. If the products of these programs all become hotel desk clerks and roofers in Western cities, the entire aid agenda is wasted.

In Canada, in 2008, an extraordinary 60% of immigrants with university degrees were working in occupations that required an apprenticeship or less. Of “chronically poor” immigrants in Canada, 41% have university degrees. In other words, countries like Canada have been bringing in the wrong sorts of workers for a generation. **High-skilled primary immigrants are 18% more likely to fall into low-income poverty than their low-skilled family-class counterparts.**

When immigrants enter without their networks of relatives and village neighbors, they are more likely to become isolated and unsocialized, to fall into criminality. When settlement of families is restricted, arrival cities and their supportive networks are unable to take shape, and behavior changes. They are forced into “dependence on informal, and increasingly criminal, networks and institutions.” Successful attempts to prevent the arrival city from forming have actually created waves of religious conservatism, sexual oppression, and organized crime. Such practices are the products not of arrival but of failed arrival. When we invest in the arrival city and give it a chance to flourish, it acts as an antidote to such extremes. As of 2005, for the first time more immigrants were living in the suburbs than in the central cities of the US—called “melting-pot suburbs” or “ethnoburbs”.

Poland was deprived of skilled workers from its EU accession in 2004 until the economic crisis of 2008. Almost anyone with a trade, from plumbers and bricklayers to surgeons and MRI technicians had left for the West. There was no reason for another generation to stay on the land. The economic crisis of 2008 sent hundreds of thousands of them and other eastern Europeans back home, returning with savings, connections, and skills. They used migration to urbanize themselves in the cities of the Atlantic, then returned not to the village but to the major cities of their own countries, bringing savings and entrepreneurial knowledge with them.

The only sorts of bodies to be found in most villages across China now are small children, livestock, and grandparents. An entire generation of Chinese children has grown up without seeing their parents more than once a year, usually for a few weeks during the spring festival in February, turning the peasant homestead into a surrogate for the absent state. For most of the 140m arrival-city workers who lack urban residency, the village is the only place to send children to school, to obtain medical help, or to get child-care service. 500m people may be without any form of social assistance. The village and its subsistence crops provide the closest thing to a social safety net for most arrival-city residents. The village is functioning as a de facto child-care facility, retirement home and unemployment-insurance system. Remittances from urban areas, combined with increases in farm income, have lifted more than 400m Chinese out of absolute poverty.

Thus, the Chinese ex-villager is caught in an endless paradox, in which the farm village and the arrival-city neighborhood support each other’s worst qualities, causing migrants, families, and entire communities to be trapped without a permanent and secure home. The “hollow village,” as these rural enclaves of children and grandparents are known in China, has become a global phenomenon, as subsistence farming is forced to serve as a substitute for a proper social safety net.

Peasant villagers in poor, remote districts around the world are choking on debt. Families typically owe banks and private lenders \$500 each, close to a year’s income. And the debt keeps mounting. The suicide rate for poor male farmers

in Maharashtra state is nearly 75 per 100,000, compared to non-farming laborers at 20. Suicides are committed by drinking insecticide. Soil exhaustion is almost universal. As farmers watch their crop yields plummet and expenses rise, desperation, indebtedness, and suicide result. In regions closer to major cities, farmers in similar straits avoid this fate. After Partition in 1947, the farm families in this region of India abandoned primogeniture, in which the eldest son inherits the entire farm and younger sons become farm laborers or move to the city. After the death of the patriarch, the holdings are divided among interested sons. Across this region, farms quickly became smaller, with devastating consequences.

Agriculture is no longer always the most sensible way for villagers to make a living. It makes more sense for a small core of people to operate small or medium-sized commercial farms, a larger group to work as farm laborers, and even more to work in non-agricultural rural jobs. The arrival city is urbanizing the village, both culturally and in its forms of economic organization. The 2nd generation, the children born in the arrival city, have far less inclination either to send money back to the village or to build their status there. A basic injection of money and knowledge will turn a subsistence peasant farm into a job-generating commercial farm. The fate of the village rests largely in the way countries manage their major cities and the rights and resources provided to the migrants living there. Conversely, the fate of cities and nations often depends on the handling of villages and the people moving out of them.

Domestic service, particularly among women, was most frequently the gateway into full rural-urban migration in the 19th century (as it often is today). It was not until the final half of the 18th century that village-arrival enclaves became a notable and influential feature of the urban landscape. Such arrival cities were the driving force in Western political change. For most of the previous 5000 years, big cities functioned as “population sumps.” They soaked up large numbers of rural people, held them for a few years, and promptly killed them, usually before they could reproduce or settle in any meaningful way. Before most people had developed immunity, sanitation, or medicine, cities were great pools of untreatable, lethal “diseases of civilization,” such as smallpox, measles, and the mumps. The odds of surviving to adulthood in early modern cities were rarely better than even. Cities, like armies, destroyed people almost as fast as they could take them in.

Change came about because the tightening web of global commerce and communication created a homogenous human pool of immunity across Europe and much of Asia, rendering many formerly lethal epidemic diseases endemic (that is, merely childhood diseases). This new immunity unleashed an unprecedented population boom—aided by younger marriages and more nourishing crops. In Europe and China, the populations increased 5-7X after 1750. This put enormous and all but insupportable strain on village communities, who began migrating to cities. The French Revolution was above all an uprising of the arrival city.

In the German states, England, and Wales, farmers were learning to intensify their yields and turn agriculture into a high-employment business through a set of innovations known as high farming. Between 1750 and 1870, farming became a high-productivity business by means of several innovations: large-scale drainage, irrigation, and use of fertilizers; new technology, such as steel tills, seed drills, and threshers; better animal feed and selective breeding; crop rotation, buoyed by new fallow and fodder crops; and high-yield food crops, like potatoes, turnips, and sugar beets. High farming required far more labor per hectare, sometimes by 3X and therefore increased rural employment; it also produced many times more food, ending the Malthusian trap.

These changes created a surplus population of tens of millions who abandoned the countryside and sought work in cities, either in their own country or across the Atlantic. Nothing quite approached the horror or inhumanity of Ireland’s transition enacted by colonial laws that were often savage. Barcelona became one of the first cities to embrace the arrival city in its urban plans. The last 2 decades of the 19th century saw a European revolution in both intergenerational (you versus your parents) mobility and intragenerational mobility (you end up better off than you were born). Social barriers became more permeable, and both sorts of mobility increased throughout the century’s final decades. The years of increasing social mobility were the years during which public education, child-labor laws, hygiene and housing reforms, and rudimentary social welfare were introduced. Numerous studies have found that the 2 trends tracked one another. Such reforms blocked the transmission of poverty and permanent pauperism. Social mobility increased as public education and social-welfare policies were introduced.

Throughout the 19th century, North America offered stunning levels of upward mobility. 81% of sons of unskilled laborers moved up into higher occupations, compared with only 53% of British sons. The resulting response created the largest international migration in human history. Fully 20% of Europeans moved to the Americas, Australia, or South Africa. What made North America in the late 19th and early 20th century so different from Europe—and so different from North America today—was the scale of home ownership among the newly arrived poor. The result was an extremely high rate of upward social mobility. The temporary innovations of the First World War, passport and immigration control, became permanent features of the nation states of the West.

Mass seizure of unused urban land became an international phenomenon in the 1970s. In the fight for space in the city, the main weapon of the rural émigré is physical presence. Turkey granted formal ownership of makeshift houses and title deeds to the land under them, turning them from a threat to the state into an instrument of state welfare. Prime Minister Özal’s 1983 land-ownership law won over the outskirts of Istanbul by replacing the passions of revolutionary activism with the more pedestrian delights of home ownership. By 1987, 74% of these houses had tap water, 90% indoor toilets,

and 91% electricity. By 1989, they made up 2/3 of Istanbul's urban space. Turkey had become a nation of arrival cities. Half of all Turks lived in cities, up from 20% in 1950. "The reforms turned us all into property owners and changed the way we think—we all started to think the way that owners think," said one former violent activist. Often what is visible, painfully missing is the assistance of the state, good schools, transit networks, and social services that allow villagers to turn their children into full-fledged urbanites. The failure of government to produce these things led to an uneasy political situation. But private land created not only prosperity, but selfishness: People expanded their properties to the maximum extent of the title deeds, building over sidewalks, parks, semi-public squares. There was a reluctance to sacrifice land or raise funds for parks or better schools. The newly emerged environment was poor in its open, public and semi-public spaces.

It was not until the crisis years of the 1990s that a political party arrived that was born and nurtured in the arrival cities. The party's mayoral candidate, Recep Erdogan, was in many respects the quintessential "arrival city" citizen. His electoral victory in 1994 was decisive and alarming to most in central Istanbul. His Welfare Party campaign offices took the role that might have been occupied by the state, filling the gaps in a laissez-faire urban economy that left former villagers without support. Its "army of covered women" were there to help the sick land a hospital bed, to distribute food on freezing winter days, to provide a small present to newlyweds, and to help with the cost of a funeral." At the national level, what seemed to be happening with his AK party could be described as a privatization of religious belief.

The 1979 revolution in Tehran was a revolution of the arrival city and its main cause was urban property, as 9-12m people had moved from rural areas to Iran's major cities in the previous 15 years. The Shah had created a mass opposition and therewith a responsive audience for the small groups of extremists who took up arms against the regime. At that point 94% of Tehran's working-class population had been born somewhere else, usually in a village. In his speeches of early 1979, the Shah promised all Tehranis and all peasants their own land. As the revolution turned theocratic, it turned the Ayatollah into a perpetual, all-powerful Supreme Leader, safe from the anger and disillusionment of the secular middle classes because it carefully maintained the loyalty of the far larger mass of arrival-city residents. During the next 25 years, 5 comprehensive laws would be passed to regulate urban land, most of them restricting its use and exchange. The citizens of Tehran's outskirts have become deeply opposed to religious politics. A succession of Iranian governments has repeated the mistakes of the Shah: treating the arrival cities as a threat rather than an opportunity; failing to give them the physical or financial resources to grow, instead focusing on the lower middle classes of the downtown core; and, in the process, creating a huge division of wealth.

50m Europeans lived in an arrival city in 2005. France had cut off an entire generation's future, blocking the

path forward to the city and backward to the village--and thousands of young people reacted in the only way they knew. Health care and, above all, employment pertain to the *sphere of citizenship and not that of ethnicity*. **A failure of assimilation is better understood as an arrested rural-urban transition.** African and Arab children and teenagers inhabited a parentless world that pulled many of them into delinquency, others simply into bitterness and anomie. One of the strange paradoxes of large, high-rise public-housing projects is that they suffer from a low-population density. The neighborhoods that work best as urban neighborhoods and arrival cities—2-5 story structures with direct access to the road and small businesses below—tend to be very high density.

Berlin's Turks are caught in a time warp. Women have fared better in the squatter outskirts of Istanbul than in the Turkish neighborhoods of Berlin. Missing from the German arrival city is citizenship, in both the legal and cultural sense. The proportion of Turks who become naturalized Germans has never exceeded 3% each year. From the beginning German policy seemed almost hard-wired to produce a failed arrival city, one whose residents can neither establish themselves in a meaningful way nor realistically expect to move permanently back to their villages. Because so few Turks are allowed citizenship, they are prevented from forming businesses by German laws, so their rate of entrepreneurship is lower than among Turkish communities in other European countries.

Parla, Spain first tackled the dangerous obstacle of citizenship in 2005 with an amnesty program that put almost 600,000 undocumented but fully employed immigrants on the path to full Spanish citizenship. It allows Spain to add 1/2m immigrants to its economy each year without creating a marginalized class on the outskirts. When regularization happened, Moroccans across the neighborhood rushed out to buy their flats. "It leveled the playing field--it gave us equality with the Spanish citizens of Parla. Suddenly we could do things like start a business or buy a flat or even put up a building." Because they were citizens rather than outsiders, the Moroccans did not become an underground threat. In 2009, Spain saw a 70% decline in the numbers of Africans arriving illegally by boat, while Greece, without such citizenship policies, increased 40%. Even in the midst of the crisis there is a sense of optimism and opportunity: People here are not trapped.

Stucco and paint (on exteriors) are worldwide badges of disposable income. Rural migrants consider transformation to be the norm. In fact, they expect it. The problem isn't the presence of evil; it is the absence of normal city institutions and functions. A dense network of mutual connections defines the arrival city as it develops its own grassroots municipal government: first security, then education, then a proper link to the larger city, physically and economically. Sao Paulo's dramatic reduction in crime rates during the 2002 was due not primarily to police enforcement or gang organization but to economic development.

If the arrival city is to function at all, it must create members of a middle class. Even a small one, within a poor community can generate a “neighborhood feedback effect” in which investments in the higher education of children become a behavioral norm. By equalizing village and city, the middle-class arrival city puts an end to rural-urban migration. It has been the historic norm and has occurred in the cities of Europe and North America throughout the late 19th and 20th centuries. It can be observed in Turkey, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and Mumbai. Still, these places remain the global exception rather than the rule. Many arrival cities are failing to give members of their 2nd generation, no matter how hard they work or school themselves, the chance to enter the middle class (families that earn 75-150% of a country’s median income). An important identifying characteristic is their ability to deploy savings and investment to alter their future status. The site of failed mobility turned out to be the institutions and functions that are most needed to make the arrival city work. Two problems are endemic across the world of arrival cities: an illiberal property market rigidly reined in by zoning and rent-control regulations and ownership restrictions, and an underdeveloped credit market. In the developing cities of Asia, Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Arab states, 25-75% of the urban population is living on land with no clear title.

Property ownership is the beginning and end of social-mobility issues. Simple granting of property ownership to rural-migrant squatters in the outskirts, and easing the process of forming businesses for them, was a far better method of ending poverty and creating a middle class than any state-driven solutions. De Soto’s methods of doing this dramatically affected both South America and Washington. His methods have become orthodox among governments across the developing world. Yet land ownership often accomplishes little without a wide and expensive range of government-funded services and supports. Arrival cities require a welfare-oriented political will and strength in which a formalization of economic relations makes up an important but far from sufficient foundation. Real security in housing is buttressed by local schools and jobs, healthcare facilities, water, and sewer services, and transportation networks. This whole complex of necessities and amenities give value to property. Without auxiliary services and infrastructure, title alone has little meaning.

Higher population density is better for social cohesion and prosperity. Zoning restrictions are nearly eliminated so that retail, light-industrial, and commercial services can be mixed with housing. A violent or threatening ethnic culture is nothing more than the temporary product of an ill-designed urban form or economic structure. Making a neighborhood less orderly, less planned, and less preordained will not only create a greater physical and economic bond with the wider city but it will solve a number of other root-cause problems of arrival-city failure. It will create an internal economy, at first based on low-level shops and services, but eventually developing a lower middle class. It will develop a functioning property market for those migrants whose businesses succeed enough to let

them buy their apartments. This, in turn, will attract an “outside” middle class from the original city, who ideally will blend with the emerging migrant middle class. And this, in turn, will solve one of the most significant problems of the arrival city, the terrible state of schools.

The most successful urban neighborhoods in the world are neither low density nor highly zoned: The best sections of Manhattan, the London neighborhoods of Kensington and Chelsea, the 6th and 7th arrondissements of Paris, for example, are very high-density, mixed-use districts. The successful arrival city provides space for spontaneity. Urban neighborhoods are treated as organic entities, permitted to grow, change, and develop functions as their residents desire, without restrictions on usage, intensity, or change. Dense, privately owned spaces with access to the street create a community sense of self-surveillance and security. These ideas influenced a generation of urban thinkers and played a huge role in the revitalization of the urban cores of Western cities in the 1970s and ‘80s. Arrival cities transform themselves from destitute poverty traps into pathways to success when they develop effective and well-connected internal governments.

In an era then the value and effectiveness of foreign aid has fallen into question, one of the few truly effective, sustainable, and life-transforming channels for international assistance is the arrival city. It will serve several generations of arrivals and produce multiplying benefits among both urban and rural poor communities. It is the one channel that can make foreign aid work. More prosperous neighborhoods often evolve into long rows of 5-story buildings with shops on the ground floor. This is an almost ideal arrangement for self-managed neighborhoods. You end up with 80% more land you can use for economic development.

Arrival cities need most the tools to become normal urban communities. Sewage, garbage collection, and paved roads are vital and can be provided only from outside. Affordable and regular bus service are next, followed by street lighting. Electricity and running water are often *not* considered priorities at all by slum-dwellers. The more successful they are, the higher the apparent poverty rate. It appears unchangingly poor and segregated only if you fail to observe the trajectory of each resident. Ethnic clustering gives arrivals the benefit of “differential citizenship,” allowing them to participate in a culture of transition. In cities like Toronto the process of urban acculturation was, for a century, a largely spontaneous and migrant-driven experience. As a result, governments are only now learning that they need to take a role in urban transition. This cycle of mutual assistance has created a true arrival-city middle class whose interests tend to dominate political policy at the provincial and federal levels, making the process of arrival a central and continual issue of Canadian politics, regardless which party is in power, as much as in Brazil or Turkey. As demographic growth slows and new waves of low-skilled immigrants are needed in coming years, it is important that North American and European cities pay attention to the needs of the villagers entering their perimeters.

A sizable new body of scholarship shows that ethnic “clustering” can be the most effective pathway to social and economic integration. Arrival cities remain poor only because they are constantly receiving new (poor) arrivals. And segregation, contrary to media stereotype, may actually deter violent extremism. Of the 75 alleged al-Qaida members arrested in Britain on terrorism charges between 2004-2009, only 17 came from neighborhoods with more than 18% Muslim populations; a majority of 42 lived in places with fewer than 6% Muslims. Terrorism may be more likely to arise in places other than arrival cities. Their tight-knit networks tend to deter the worst forms of extremism. They are a significant locus of struggle for (urban) citizenship and transformation in urban configuration.

The crucial paradox of the arrival city is that its occupants want to stop living in an arrival city—either by making money and moving their families and village networks out or by turning the neighborhood itself into something better. Most, if they succeed, tend to produce their own obsolescence. The ultimate lesson is that it does not simply add itself on to the edges of the city; it *becomes* the city. Whether it does so creatively or destructively is matter of engagement. Yesterday’s alien villagers and immigrants become today’s urban merchants and tomorrow’s professionals and political leaders. Without this metamorphosis, cities stagnate and die. The arrival city is an expensive place in the short run, absorbing more public revenue than it produces at first. Yet 3 centuries of urban history have shown us that the investment is well worth it, both for the huge gains it produces and for the terrible tolls it averts.

[The book provides the clearest explanation in personal terms of the causes and solutions to migration issues I’ve found. **The 21st century will put an end to the major theme of human history, continuous population growth. Rural living is the largest single killer of humans today. The arrival city accomplished the things that bring fertility rates down: educating girls and women, improving health, and creating physical and financial security. Countries rarely experience economic growth while banning or restricting rural-urban migration. The unimpeded arrival city was a more effective form of development than any known economic, social, or population-control policy. Housing without business space can lock tenants into permanent dependency. Almost all policy efforts to restrict or end immigration have failed. High-skilled primary immigrants are 18% more likely to fall into low-income poverty than their low-skilled family-class counterparts. A failure of assimilation is better understood as an arrested rural-urban transition. Property ownership is the beginning and end of social-mobility issues. The most successful urban neighborhoods in the world are neither low density nor highly zoned.**